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THE DEFINITION OF DOPING AND THE
PROOF OF A DOPING OFFENSE (AN ANTI-
DOPING RULE VIOLATION) UNDER
SPECIAL CONSIDERATION OF THE
GERMAN LEGAL POSITION
KLAUS VIEWEG*
INTRODUCTION
Disputes in athletics, and in sport generally, were still relatively rare a few
decades ago, especially disputes involving the athletes themselves. However
the control of doping and commercialization and professionalization have al-
tered the situation. The earnings of professional athletes have become so con-
siderable that in each case the sanction for an anti-doping rule violation can
have a major impact on the athlete's career and profession and his economic
losses can amount to a very large sum of money. Moreover the sanction may
make commercial contracts void and in this way extend its impact outside of
sport.1 This illustrates the need for a legally acceptable definition of doping
and the importance of questions of proof, as in many cases the career of an
athlete depends on these findings.
THE DEFINITION OF DOPING
There is neither a common legal definition of the term "doping" for all
sports, nor are there any binding legal criteria for such a definition. Rather the
content of a "doping" offense is defined by the sports organizations in their
own individual manner. Therefore, the definition of doping generally varies
between the international sport organizations. 2 As a consequence of the hierar-
chical structure of the sports organizations, these definitions of doping are
transferred from the international to the national sports organizations, which
Institute of Technology and the Law, Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nuremberg,
Germany
1. LAURI TARASTI, LEGAL SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL DOPING CASES 35 (2001).
2. GEORGE ENGELBRECHT, ADOPTION, RECOGNITION AND HARMONIZATION OF DOPING
SANCTIONS BETWEEN WORLD SPORT ORGANISATIONS 3ff (2000); C. Prokop, DIE GRENZEN DER
DOPINGVERBOTE 93 (2000).
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are obliged to incorporate these definitions in their own system of rules and
regulations.
Nevertheless, the World Anti-Doping Code (WADC) 3 of the World Anti-
Doping Agency (WADA) has nearly become a standard for doping rules and
regulations and the definition of doping. On the one hand, the International
Olympic Committee (IOC) has put considerable pressure on the international
sports organizations to adopt its standard of doping rules (Olympic Movement
Anti-Doping Code) as a condition for being allowed to take part in the Olym-
pic Games. 4 On the other hand, the need for harmonization for doping rules
and regulations has become obvious.
The WADC demonstrates the two principle ways in which doping can be
legally defined: a) an abstract definition or b) the so-called "pragmatic" defini-
tion, characterized in particular by a list of prohibited substances and methods.
In the WADC, both approaches are used in Article 1 and 2 which read as fol-
lows:
Article 1
Doping is defined as the occurrence of one or more of the anti-doping
rule violations set forth in Article 2.1 through Article 2.8 of the Code.
Article 2
The following constitute anti-doping rule violations:
2.1 The presence of a Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites or
Markers in an Athlete's bodily Specimen.
2.1.1 It is the Athlete's personal duty to ensure that no Prohibited Sub-
stance enters his or her body. Athletes are responsible for any Prohib-
ited Substance or its Metabolites or Markers found to be present in
their bodily Specimens. Accordingly, it is not necessary that intent,
fault, negligence or knowing Use on the Athlete's part be demon-
strated in order to establish an anti-doping violation under Article 2.1.
2.1.2 Excepting those substances for which a quantitative reporting
threshold is specifically identified in the Prohibited list, the detected
presence of any quantity of a Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites
or Markers in an Athlete's Sample shall constitute an anti-doping rule
violation.
3. World Anti-Doping Code (WADC), at http://www.wada-ama.org/docs/web/ stan-
dardsharmonization/code/code v3.pdf (last visited Dec. 3, 2004).
4. Thomas Bach, Lausanner Erkidrung zum Doping und ihre Folgen, in DoPING-FORuM 75 (V.
R6hricht & K. Vieweg eds., 2000).
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2.1.3 As an exception to the general rule of Article 2.1, the Prohibited
List may establish special criteria for the evaluation of Prohibited
Substances that can also be produced endogenously.
2.2 Use or Attempted Use of a Prohibited Substance or a Prohibited
Method.
2.2.1 The success or failure of the Use of a Prohibited Substance or
Prohibited Method is not material. It is sufficient that the Prohibited
Substance or Prohibited Method was Used or Attempted to be Used
for an anti-doping rule violation to be committed.
2.3. Refusing, or failing without compelling justification, to submit to
Sample collection after notification as authorized in applicable anti-
doping rules or otherwise evading Sample collection.
2.4 Violation of applicable requirements regarding Athlete availability
for Out-of-Competition Testing including failure to provide required
whereabouts information and missed tests which are declared based on
reasonable rules.
2.5 Tampering, or Attempting to tamper, with any part of Doping
Control.
2.6 Possession of Prohibited Substances and Methods:
2.6.1 Possession by an Athlete at any time or place of a substance that
is prohibited in Out-of-Competition Testing or a Prohibited Method
unless the Athlete establishes that the Possession is pursuant to a
therapeutic use exemption granted in accordance with Article 4.4
(Therapeutic Use) or other acceptable justification.
2.6.2 Possession of a substance that is prohibited in Out-of-
Competition Testing or a Prohibited Method by Athlete Support Per-
sonnel in connection with an Athlete, Competition or training, unless
the Athlete Support Personnel establishes that the Possession is pursu-
ant to a therapeutic use exemption granted to an Athlete in accordance
with Article 4.4 (Therapeutic Use) or other acceptable justification.
2.7 Trafficking in any Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method.
2.8 Administration or Attempted administration of a Prohibited Sub-
stance or Prohibited Method to any Athlete, or assisting, encouraging,
aiding, abetting, covering up or any other type of complicity involving
an anti-doping rule violation or any Attempted violation.5
5. WADC, art. 1-2.8, at http://www.wada-ama.org/docs/web/standards
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However, an abstract definition of doping leaves the question open as to
where doping begins. Without any further criteria, this question is considered
almost insolvable as the technical approach of Article 1 of the Code demon-
strates. Therefore, such an abstract definition must be regarded as not being
precise and well-defined enough, and therefore not legally binding. 6 In this re-
spect, the aims of the fight against doping are to be taken into account. The In-
troduction to the WADC defines the purposes of the World Anti-Doping Pro-
gram as follows: It aims on protecting the Athlete's fundamental right to
participate in doping-free sport, and thus promote health, fairness, and equality
for Athletes worldwide and the ensuring harmonized, coordinated, and effec-
tive anti-doping programs at the international and national level with regard to
detection, deterrence, and prevention of doping. Predominant and legally ac-
ceptable is the more pragmatic definition of doping based on a list of prohib-
ited substances and methods.
Judges then have to rely upon the list of forbidden substances set up by the
sports organizations, for example the IAAF or, in most cases, the IOC. The
lists of forbidden substances include only examples of substances in the pro-
hibited classes. It has been calculated how many substances the lists would
have to contain if not only examples, but rather the whole list of known sub-
stances would be included. Such an enumerative list would include for narcot-
ics, anabolic agents and diuretics about 130 to 170 substances; the number of
forbidden stimulants would increase from around 43 to at least 290, perhaps
even to 526 substances. 7
For this reason, and in order to take into account the rapid development of
medicine, the last point in this list of prohibited substances is an open defini-
tion of doping with the term "and related substances." 8 The term is defined in
Chapter I Article 1 of the Olympic Movement Anti-Doping Code: "Related
substance means any substance having pharmacological action and/or chemi-
cal structure similar to a Prohibited Substance or any other substance referred
to in this code." However, without the help of a specialist, an athlete cannot
know these substances. Therefore, this wide addition to the otherwise enu-
merative list of forbidden substances is in conflict with the principle of cer-
tainty. Accordingly, an athlete always has to be able to differentiate between
allowed and forbidden behavior. This is obviously not the case if such a judg-
_harmonization/code/codev3.pdf (last visited Dec. 3, 2004)
6. U. Haas, Aktuelle Entwicklungen in der Dopingbekdimpfung, SPURT at 6.
7. R. K. MUller et al, Banned Agents and Related Compounds - How Many?, in 7 RECENT
ADVANCES IN DOPING ANALYSIS 14 (W. Schaenzer et al. eds., 1999).
8. K. Vieweg, Grundinformationen zur Dopingproblematik, in DOPING: REALITrT UND RECHT
24 (K. Vieweg ed., 1998).
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ment can only be made by a highly skilled expert. It is therefore questionable
as to whether this definition of doping is precise enough to withstand legal
challenge; its validity is increasingly being questioned. The list of the prohib-
ited substances should therefore be as complete as possible to avoid legal
problems.
THE PROOF OF AN ANTI-DOPING RULE VIOLATION (DOPING OFFENSE)
Strict Liability
The sanction for an anti-doping rule violation within sport is not a criminal
punishment in the sense of criminal law. 9 It is a disciplinary sanction within
sport, normally under private law. The principles of criminal law, especially
the principle of "in dubio pro reo" and "nulla poena sine culpa," are not appli-
cable.' 0 Therefore, the burden of proof, that is, the risk of not succeeding be-
fore court when the facts are not proved, is very important.
The burden of proof in a doping case lies in sport with the sport organiza-
tion - the accusing party. It has to provide proof of the anti-doping rule viola-
tion and, if necessary, of culpability. Normally, there is no evidence other than
the finding of the prohibited substance or its metabolites or markers in the
sample of the athlete. This is strong evidence for an anti-doping rule violation
and is, except for the few cases where a confession or witness evidence is
available, the only possibility for efficient doping control.
The approach that the objective finding of a forbidden substance or its me-
tabolites or markers in the body fluids of an athlete is grounds for a sanction
for an anti-doping rule violation has been - somewhat misleading - labeled
"strict liability." In law, the term "strict liability" is usually understood as li-
ability without intent or negligence. It implies no intentional element; there is
no tie between the sanction and intent. In doping, "strict liability" means that
the sanction is an inevitable consequence if an anti-doping rule violation has
been established, irrespective of culpability.
The World Anti-Doping Code mentions the rule of strict liability in five
places:
9. WADC, Doping Control (comment to introduction, part 1) at http://www.wada-
ama.org/docs/web/standardsharmonization/code/codev3.pdf (last visited Dec. 3, 2004).
10. TARASTI, supra note 1, at 65; Christian Krdhe, Beweislastprobleme bei Doping im interna-
tionalen Sport - am Beispiel des Olympic Movement Anti-Doping-Codes, in DOPING: SANKTIONEN,
BEWEISE, ANSPRUCHE, SPORT 42 (J. Fritzweiler ed., 2000); see also Aanes v. FILA, CAS
2001/A/317.
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(1) Article 2, WADA-Code, specifies the circumstances and conduct that con-
stitute violations of anti-doping rules. According to Article 2.1, in particular, it
is each athlete's personal duty to ensure that no prohibited substance enters his
or her body. Article 2.1.1 states accordingly that it is not necessary that intent,
fault, negligence on knowing use on the athlete's part be demonstrated in order
to establish an anti-doping violation. The added comment lays out that the
code adopts the rule of strict liability which is found in the Olympic Move-
ment Anti-Doping Code and the vast majority of existing anti-doping rules.
Referring to Article 9 (automatic disqualification of individual results) and
Art. 10.5 (elimination or reduction of period of ineligibility based on excep-
tional circumstances) it is stated that the code provides a reasonable balance
between effective anti-doping enforcement for the benefit of all "clean" ath-
letes and fairness in the exceptional circumstance where a prohibited sub-
stance entered an athlete's system through no fault or negligence on the ath-
lete's part. The concept of the WADC is to base the violation of anti-doping
rules on strict liability, but not to impose automatically a fixed period of ineli-
gibility. To support this concept, the Code refers to the jurisdiction of the
Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), in particular the case Quigley v. UIT. As
a general reference, this is not correct. First, this case dealt just with disquali-
fication and not with ineligibility. Secondly, other decisions of CAS can be in-
terpreted in a different way."
(2) Article 3.1, WADA-Code (burdens and. standards of proof) points out that
the anti-doping organization has the burden of establishing that an anti-doping
rule violation has occurred. The standard of proof is prescribed with the words
"comfortable satisfaction of the hearing body" which shall be greater than a
mere balance of probability, but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
However, the standard of proof shall be made a balance of probability where
the Code places the burden of proof on the athlete. The comment states that
this standard is comparable to that which is applied in most countries to cases
involving professional misconduct and that this standard has also been widely
applied by courts and tribunals in doping cases. 12
(3) Article 9, WADA-Code (automatic disqualification of individual results)
states that an anti-doping rule violation in connection with an in-competition
test automatically leads to disqualification of the individual result obtained in
that competition (with all resulting consequences, including forfeiture of any
11. Personal communication with F. OschUtz.
12. See, e.g., N., J., Y., W. v. Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur (FINA), CAS
1998/208 (1998) in DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS II, at 234 (Matthieu Reeb ed., 2002).
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medals, points and prizes). The comment says that this principle has already
been laid down in the OMADC. Furthermore, the comment makes clear that
the principle of fairness requires the disqualification of the athlete violating the
anti-doping rules regardless whether he or she was at fault in any way.
(4) Article 10.1, WADA-Code (disqualification of results in event during
which an anti-doping rule violation occurs) rules that an anti-doping rule vio-
lation occurring during or in connection with an event may, upon the decision
of the ruling body of the event, lead to disqualification of all of the athlete's
individual results in that event with all consequences, except (Article 10.1.1
WADA-Code) the athlete establishes that he or she bears no fault or negli-
gence for the violation (presumption of fault). However, this exception is not
applied if the athlete's results in other competitions were likely to have been
affected by the athlete's anti-doping rule violatiton (e.g. cases Muihlegg,
White).
(5) Article 10.5, WADA-Code (elimination or reduction of period of ineligi-
bility based on exceptional circumstances) is based on the presumption of the
athlete's fault or negligence. Consequently, the athlete is usually ineligible for
the determined period. However, if in an individual case he or she is able to
rebut this presumption, the otherwise applicable period of ineligibility shall be
eliminated. Accordingly, this period may be reduced, if an athlete establishes
that he or she bears no significant fault or negligence. The comment states that
this principle was accepted at the World Conference on Doping in Sport and
was incorporated into the Olympic Movement Anti-Doping Code (OMADC)
according to the basic principle of human rights. This approach reflects a
pragmatic compromise between those anti-doping organizations applying the
strict liability doctrine without exemptions and those anti-doping organizations
attaching great importance to the principle of fault and the principle of propor-
tionality (the comment illustrates the operation of Article 10.5 with some ex-
amples).
Unlike the first and the second drafts of the Anti-Doping Code, the most
critical points concerning the compatibility of the code with German law that
have been stated by the Federal Republic of Germany 13 have been taken into
consideration. Particularly, from the German point of view, due to the basic
constitutional principles of fault and proportionality, it was necessary to incor-
13. Comments Regarding the Draft World Anti-Doping-Code (Federal Republic of Germany,
December 10, 2002); Comment by the Federal Republic of Germany on the WADA Draft of the
World Anti-Doping Code of September 2002.
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porate an exemption of the rule of strict liability as in Article 10.5 WADA-
Code. Therefore, there is a chance that the regulation will now be accepted by
the German courts as according with German law.
This is generally accepted for the disqualification of the athlete. For ex-
ample, Article 3.3 of the OMADC states that "any case of doping during a
competition automatically leads to invalidation of the result obtained, with all
its consequences, including forfeit of any medals and prizes." This is deemed
necessary to protect the "clean" athletes who take part in the competition; dis-
qualification is therefore considered as nothing more than the removal of ille-
gally acquired advantages in the competition. 14 The CAS has consequently
stated that
the system of strict liability of the athlete must prevail when sporting
fairness is at stake. This means that, once a banned substance is dis-
covered in the urine or blood of an athlete, he must automatically be
disqualified from the competition in question, without any possibility
for him to rebut this presumption of guilt.... The result of the event
has indeed been objectively influenced and, consequently, the inten-
tion of the author is irrelevant. 15
If further sanctions like a fine or a ban are to be imposed, the principle of
strict liability is, from a legal point of view, no longer applicable. 16 Such fur-
ther sanctions'can only be imposed in the case of culpability (intention or neg-
ligence) and have to take into account the individual extent of fault in order to
be in accordance with generally accepted principles of law. 7 An automatic
sanction would be disproportionate, and at least under German law, unconsti-
tutional. Sanctions can therefore only be imposed if the athlete is found liable,
that is in the case of intent or negligence. This is the prevailing opinion and
that of CAS. 18
This intentional element is proven by using the so-called principle of
"prima-facie" proof (in German: Anscheinsbeweis), 19 which, due to the fact
14. Bach, supra note 4, at 73.
15. TARASTI, supra note 1, at 85; see also, MATTHIEU REEB, DIE CAS-RECHTSPRECHUNG IN
DOPING-F.ALLEN 64 (2000).
16. Aanes v. FILA, CAS 2001/A/317. This is the position under Swiss law (see for example,
MARGARETA BADDELEY, L'ASSOCIATION SPORTIvE FACE AU DRoIT 243 (1993)), and in accordance
with the Council of Europe's Anti-Doping Convention. A German Court of Appeal in the Baumann
case also held that liability without fault was incompatible with the rights of the athlete and German
law. See OLG Frankfurt/Main, 13W29/00 (judgment from May 18, 2000).
17. Kraihe, supra note 9, at 51.
18. Reeb, supra note 13, at 65.
19. The basic principle of the prima facie proof is used by both the IAAF arbitration panel and
the CAS, although the terminology used is often slightly different, for example, "shifting the burden
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that it is proportionate, is constitutional. With respect to the principle of pro-
portionality, it is necessary to weigh the interests of the athlete, in particular
his right of personality, against those of the federation.
20
Prima Facie Proof of Doping
Prima facie proof allows culpable behavior or a cause of a finding to be
proved in an indirect manner by using presumptions based on experience. For
this, a typical cause of action must exist. In other words, facts must exist
which can be regarded as the typical result of a certain behavior.
In doping, this can be phrased as follows: an athlete in whose body fluids
a forbidden substance has been found has, according to experience, adminis-
tered or used the substance, and has done this in a culpable way, in other
words with intent or due to negligence. By proving the existence of the fact,
the behavior that may have caused it is therefore also proven. The prima facie
proof therefore consists of a double presumption: first, of the use or applica-
tion of the substance, and second, of a culpable element.
21
Nevertheless, the prima facie proof is only a presumption. The athlete can
defend himself and rebut the presumption by providing evidence that the find-
ing of the substance may have other causes than the application of the sub-
stance. He may for example state that the substance has entered his body as a
contamination of a nutritional supplement, or was due to contaminated food,
for example, meat. However, the rules for rebutting the presumption of the
prima facie proof are very strict. The mere claim or assertion of another pos-
sible cause of the finding of the substance is not enough; rather, facts have to
be presented and proved that support the thesis that not the typical, but an al-
ternative cause of action has credibly taken place.
22
As it is very difficult for the athlete to present such credible facts, the re-
buttal of the presumption has seldom succeeded. Therefore, the liability of the
of proof to the athlete after a positive finding," this giving the presumption of negligence of the ath-
lete. Cf TARASTI, supra note 1, at 96. The 1OC also follows this principle of a rebutable presump-
tion. See T. HAUG & C. PAUL, DISKUSSIONSBERICHT ZUM DOPING-FORUM 144, 150 (2000); see
also W. Walker, in: DOPING: REALITAT UND RECHT 144 (K. Vieweg ed., 1998)., and Margareta
Baddeley, Dopingsperren als Verbandssanktion aus nationaler und internationaler Sicht, in DOPING:
SANKTIONEN, BEWEISE, ANSPRUCHE, SPORT 22 (J. Fritzweiler ed. 2000); Meca-Medina v. Federa-
tion Internationale de Natation Amateur (FINA), CAS 1999/A/234 (2000). For a slightly different
use see, U. Steiner, Doping aus verfassungsrechtlicher Sicht, in DOPING-FORUM 125, 135-37
(V. Rohricht & K. Vieweg eds., 2000).
20. BADDELEY, supra note 14, at 239.
21. Cf Krahe, supra note 9, at 45; Bernhard v. Int'l Triathlon Union, CAS 1998/222 (1998) in
DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS It, at 330 (Matthieu Reeb ed., 2002).
22. Meca-Medina, CAS 1999/A/234.
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athlete is not a "total" liability, but once a positive doping sample has been
produced, the strict rules for the defense will make it very difficult for the ath-
lete to exonerate himself or herself.
Contamination with Forbidden Substances and the Question of Cut-offLimits
The finding of a forbidden substance, even in very low concentrations, is
taken as grounds for a prima facie proof of its culpable application. Its pres-
ence in the athlete's body is, on a basis of experience, typically caused by such
an application. Nowadays it is also known that, for example, nutritional sup-
plements may contain traces of forbidden, but not declared, substances. As a
consequence, the use of such supplements is itself considered as negligent be-
havior, as the athlete has the duty to be very careful with what substances he
or she consumes. Therefore, even if only traces of a forbidden substance are
found, the athlete is treated in the same way as if he or she had applied large
doses of the forbidden substance, which had already left the body by the time
the sample was taken. Only by proving that it was indeed a contamination and
not leftover traces of an anti-doping rule violation, can the athlete exonerate
himself. This strict treatment is often explained with the so-called "floodgate
argument," which states that if an easier excuse was possible, it would be im-
possible to fight doping efficiently. However, such strict rules on behavior can
only be imposed if the athlete is indeed able to avoid the sources of contami-
nation, which is true for nutritional supplements as there is no absolute need to
consume these substances.
The situation is only different, however, when a forbidden substance is
known to be present in everyday-food or the natural environment of an athlete,
or even produced by the body of the athlete itself.23 In such cases, it is not eas-
ily possible for the athlete to avoid such substances; their presence is therefore
no proof of negligent behavior. Moreover, regardless of questions of culpabil-
ity, the finding of a substance in such a low concentration is in many cases not
even enough proof that an anti-doping rule violation has occurred at all. Such
concentrations are not the "typical" result of an anti-doping rule violation, be-
cause it is equally possible that they result from natural sources, such as eve-
ryday food, the environment, or the body.24
Such a doping sample must not be declared positive. For this reason cut-
off limits have to be established on a sound scientific basis. 25 Only when a
23. Consequently, nutritional supplements are not included in the definition of the natural envi-
ronment or everyday food.
24. Bernhard, CAS 1998/222.
25. The doping rules have to be interpreted restrictively (teleologically) in this respect, as their
aim is to prevent illegal manipulation, but not to punish an athlete for a low random concentration of
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concentration of a forbidden substance above such "normal" concentrations is
found, is it sufficient proof that it is not merely a random presence, but allows
the presumption that it was caused by illegal drug use.
As a consequence, cut-off limits that take into account such "normal" val-
ues of the forbidden substances have to be determined. Especially when sub-
stances produced naturally by the human body are concerned, this may be
problematic due to biological variability, and leaves the athlete a certain gap to
evade doping control.
Therefore, direct methods of identifying forbidden substances like the iso-
tope mass spectrometry for anabolic agents seem preferable, as they provide
conclusive proof that the §ubstance must have been taken artificially, without
the problem of proving that it is not inside the concentration range that may be
reached normally.
"Undetectable" Doping and Medical Monitoring
As we may see in the following oral presentations concerning gene doping
and doping with hormones, it may well be that in the not too far away future
some highly sophisticated methods for doping may develop which are, with
the current analytical techniques, indeed undetectable.
As no trace of a forbidden substance will be detectable, it may become in-
creasingly important to identify "indirect" sources of proof, for example, typi-
cal changes in certain body values as a consequence of doping. The approach
in the steroid profile 26 may be taken as an example.
If such indirect indicators cannot supply sufficient proof for an anti-doping
rule violation, another approach could be to impose "health rules" in combina-
tion with a medical monitoring. This was done by the UCI until March 2001.
Another example is the upper limit of hemoglobin in blood used by some in-
ternational federations. 27
Concentrations of body values above such limits are not sufficient to
prove an anti-doping rule violation. They are not typically reached only by
doping, but can also likely be due to intense training or, for example, hypo-
baric chambers.
Therefore, if an athlete has a higher value, this is not considered an anti-
doping rule violation. However as a consequence, the athlete is still not al-
a substance. Cf Meca-Medina, CAS 1999/A/234.
26. M. Donike, Longterm influence of anabolic steroid misuse on the steroid profile, in PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE 1 I WORKSHOP ON DOPE ANALYSIS, 108 (M. Donike, et al. eds., 1993).
27. International Cycling Union (UCI), International Union for Modem Pentathlon (UIPM), In-
ternational Biathlon Union (IBU).
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lowed to compete; the athlete is prohibited from taking part in the competition
for medical reasons because of a possible dangerous body condition. This may
primarily safeguard the health of the athlete, but it also ensures equal competi-
tion between the athletes.
Medical Monitoring may provide at least an indirect method to combat
doping in sport. Until better detection methods have been found, this approach
may be an adequate and legally acceptable way to fight against doping in addi-
tion to the current doping control system.
CONCLUSIONS
As has been previously explained, there is no common legal definition of
the term doping. Doping can either be defined in an abstract manner or in a
pragmatic way, of which the latter is more predominant. According to this
pragmatic definition, the mere presence of a forbidden substance in an athlete's
body constitutes an anti-doping rule violation and could lead to the disqualifi-
cation of the athlete. On the other hand, in relation to sanctions, in particular
bans, proof of culpability is necessary. The burden of proof of the offense lies
with the accusing party, that is, the sport organization, which is made easier
due to the principle of "prima facie" proof. Nevertheless the athlete can defend
himself by providing evidence that the finding of the substance was caused by
something other than the application of the substance. This is relevant with re-
gard to substances that are produced naturally by the human body. For these
substances, cut-off limits have to be established to separate the allowed natural
state of the body from the forbidden manipulation. In relation to sanctions, the
athlete has to rebut the presumption that the finding of the substance in the
body was due to intention or negligence on the part of the athlete. However, it
is very difficult to present credible facts against negligence, and for this reason
the rebuttal of the presumption has seldom succeeded.
[Vol. 15:1
